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WHEN A VICTIM'S A VICTIM:
MAKING REFERENCE TO VICTIMS
AND SEX-CRIME PROSECUTION
Scott A. McDonald*
THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT A DEFENDANT BE SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED OR
EVEN IDENTIFIED FOR A VICTIM TO BE ENTITLED TO THE RIGHTS UNDER THIS ACT. 
1
I. INTRODUCTION
In an era of victims' rights reform, where state after state has amended its
constitution or enacted legislation to provide for enumerated victims' rights,
gender inequality continues to effect significant impediments to progress in the
criminal prosecution of sex crimes against women. This is particularly true
when the crime is rape and the defendant argues that the intercourse was con-
sensual.2 The problem is exacerbated when women who assert that they have
been victims of "non-violent" rape, or rape without externally visible trauma,
find themselves wrongfully subjected to unfair burden shifting at trial.3
The issue gained recent media attention in the case of People v. Bryant.4
The case involved a female lodge attendant in Colorado and LA Laker, Kobe
Bryant.5 The female attendant asserted that after Bryant's arrival to the lodge
she gave him a tour of the facilities and later returned to Bryant's room, at his
6request. After some consensual kissing, Bryant began groping the attendant in
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I UNIF. VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT § 101 cmt. crime (1992), 11 U.L.A. 245 (2003).
2 See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
4 Order Re Mr. Bryant's Motion to Preclude References to the Accuser as the "Victim,"
People v. Bryant (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2004) (No. 03 CR 204), available at http://www.courts.
state.co.us/exec/media/eagle/05-04/ordr re victimissue.pdf.
' Order Re Probable Cause Determination, People v. Bryant (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2003) (No. 03
CR 204), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/media/eagle/l003/ordr-re_
probable-cause.pdf.
6 Id. at 3-4.
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a sexual manner.' According to the attendant, she then tried to leave, but Bry-
ant grabbed her by the neck, bent her over a chair, and engaged in sexual inter-
course with her.8 A subsequent sexual assault exam indicated trauma that
likely occurred within twenty-four hours and that was inconsistent with consen-
sual sex.9 In situations similar to the circumstances surrounding the criminal
case against Bryant, the defendant enjoys a presumption of innocence while the
victim must struggle to overcome misplaced presumptions of promiscuity and
poor judgment.'o
To understand the magnitude of the continuing problem of rape, one need
only consider that in 2002, according to the National Crime Victimization Sur-
vey (NCVS), 247,730 rapes and sexual assaults in the United States were com-
mitted against victims over the age of 12." The 2003 Uniform Crime Report
(UCR), which classifies rape as "the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and
against her will," estimated that 93,433 forcible rapes occurred nationwide.
12
Based on U.S. Census Bureau estimates, these statistics equate to 63.2 forcible
rapes reported per 100,000 females' 3 with a national arrest rate of nine per
100,000 inhabitants. 4 However, with arrests made in just over fifty-percent of
all reported sexual assaults, and an estimated sixty-one percent of rapes unre-
ported, these statistics indicate that the state will only incarcerate one in every
sixteen rapists. 15
One particularly contentious part of the process of complaint, investiga-
tion, and adjudication, in the case of rape or sexual assault, is the determination
7 Id. at 4.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 5-6. Interestingly, the court found it important to note that the attendant admitted to
engaging in sexual intercourse with another man two days prior to the incident with Bryant.
Id. at 6.
o See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
11 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZA-
TION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2002, at 2 (2003) [hereinafter CRIMINAL VICTIMI-
ZATION], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv02.pdf. Of the total, 216,090
were female. Id. at 10.
12 FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,
2003, at 27 (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/03cius.htm.
13 id.
" Id. at 29. The disparity in the numbers between the UCR and NCVS is the result of a
difference in classification and data collection. NCVS statistics are based on self-reported
incidents while the UCR uses national averages and does not include rape of females under
the age of consent. Furthermore, the NCVS data are a compilation of all sex offenses, while
the UCR statistics are solely for forcible rapes of females.
15 Rape, Abuse and Incest National Network (RAINN) asserts that based on analysis of U.S.
Department of Justice statistics compiled by the National Center for Policy and Analysis:
If the rape is reported to police, there is a 50.8% chance that an arrest will be made. If an arrest
is made, there is an 80% chance of prosecution. If there is a prosecution, there is a 58% chance
of a felony conviction. If there is a felony conviction, there is a 69% chance the convict will
spend time in jail. So, even in the 39% of attacks that are reported to police, there is only a
16.3% chance the rapist will end up in prison. Fadtoring in unreported rapes, about 6% of
rapists-I out of 16-will ever spend a day in jail. 15 out of 16 will walk free.
http://www.rainn.org/statistics/punishing-rapists.html. For an in-depth analysis of rape com-
plaint and criminal case clearance rates in light of rape law reform see Stacy Futter & Walter
R. Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 72 (2001).
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of when a victim is in fact a victim, or more precisely, when the prosecution
may refer to the victim as the victim. Whether use of the term victim is preju-
dicial, violates the presumption of innocence, or invades the province of the
jury are matters often argued in limine. The court's resolution of the issue
often varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and within those jurisdictions,
from judge to judge. Some courts allow the prosecution to use the term victim,
alleged .victim, or accuser,' 6 and others preclude the use of any such reference
altogether. 17
It is not difficult to discern that gender inequality is at the heart of the
issue when one recognizes that the issue rarely arises in any other criminal
setting. 18 In the courtroom, "[w]omen uniquely, disproportionately and with
unacceptable frequency must endure a climate of condescension, indifference
and hostility."' 9 When a sexual act has taken place between a man and a
woman and the man asserts that the penetration was consensual, our legal sys-
tem immediately calls the status of the victim into question.2° In this situation,
courts attempt to demonstrate sympathy for the victim by affording her statu-
tory or constitutional remedies and protections provided by the local victims'
rights legislation, but remain skeptical of her veracity because of her presumed
inherent female propensity for promiscuity and general indiscretion.2 '
This Note argues that reference to the victim as the victim is not unfairly
prejudicial, does not violate the presumption of innocence, and does not invade
the province of the jury. Rather, use of the term victim accords with the pre-
sumption of validity of a complaint made by a victim-witness and courts should
permit its use until evidence rebutting the presumption is discovered. Holding
otherwise creates a presumption of invalidity of a complaint, unfairly impinges
16 For example, in People v. Bryant, the court precluded use of the term victim during trial.
Instead, the order issued provided that the court would refer to the victim as "alleged victim"
while the prosecution and any parties would refer to her by her proper name. Order, Bryant
(No. 03 CR 204), supra note 4.
17 See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 600 A.2d 21, 25 (Del. 1991) (use of the term victim "should
be avoided in the questioning of witnesses in situations where consent is an issue"); State v.
Wright, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3208, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he trial court should
refrain from using the term 'victim,' as it suggests a bias against the defendant before the
State has proven a 'victim' truly exists.").
18 See generally Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986). Estrich argues that, in
contrast to the crime of rape, with crimes such as trespass or robbery the court rarely shoul-
ders the victim with the burden of proving lack of consent, or force, to overcome a presump-
tion of diminished credibility. See also, 140 CONG. REC. H8968, 8991-92 (daily ed. Aug.
21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari concerning the prior crimes evidence rules for sexual
assault cases):
[A]dult-victim sexual assault cases are distinctive, and often turn on difficult credibility determi-
nations. Alleged consent by the victim is rarely an issue in prosecutions for other violent crimes-
the accused mugger does not claim that the victim freely handed over this wallet as a gift-but the
defendant in a rape case often contends that the victim engaged in consensual sex and then
falsely accused him.
19 Judith Resnik, Gender Matters, Race Matters, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 219, 225
(1997) (citing the results of the New York Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts,
Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, republished at 15 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 11, 17-18 (1986)).
20 See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 43-46, 60-63, and accompanying text.
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on the veracity of the accuser without merit, and fosters conventional
prejudices against rape victims.
Section II of this Note briefly discusses the historical development of the
law of rape, the critical issue of consent, rape mythologies, and victims' rights
legislation. Section III analyzes the argument that a victim should be consid-
ered a victim from the time the allegation of rape is made until the conclusion
of the trial or until evidence to the contrary is presented. In doing so, this Note
considers whether the use of the term victim creates a prejudicial effect, vio-
lates the presumption of innocence, is an improper expression of veracity or
guilt, or invades the province of the jury.
II. HiSTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
While rape is a crime with ancient roots, the concept of what constitutes
rape is continually evolving.2 2 Increased social awareness coupled with a
greater understanding of such concepts as sexual autonomy and equality,
changing gender roles, and the socio-psychological impact of victimization,
have contributed to the evolution of the elements of rape, their scope, and
potential defenses.2 3 As a result, to understand the court's apprehension in
recognizing a victim as a victim in a rape trial one must first understand the
history of the evolving crime of rape, rape mythology, and the development of
victims' rights legislation.
A. Brief History of Rape Prosecutions
1. Elements of Rape-Generally
Most state statutes define rape as the penetration of a person, however
slight, without that person's consent. 24 This definition is deliberately broad
and accommodates both traditional and evolving notions of the crime of rape.25
While the defendant may challenge identity or penetration, when those ele-
ments are not in dispute the critical issue upon which the case turns is whether
the victim consented, or whether the defendant reasonably believed the victim
consented, to the penetration.2 6
22 See Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence
of Force and the Absence Of Consent, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 1780 (1992). In his article,
Dripps discusses various forms of rape law, as it existed in ancient Roman and early English
form, and how the law evolved as a response to various social, economic, and intellectual
forces and development. See also Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape
Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1977) ("Rape, like murder, has an ancient,
if scarcely honorable, lineage.")
23 See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL (CALJIC) 10.00 (7th ed. 2005) (CALJIC
provides, inter alia, that "[e]very person who engages in an act of sexual intercourse with
another person ... against that person's will ... is guilty of the crime of rape. Any sexual
penetration, however slight, constitutes engaging in an act of sexual intercourse. 'Against
that person's will' means without the consent of the alleged victim.").
25 See infra text accompanying notes 32-37.
26 Consider, for example, a woman's withdrawal of consent after consensually engaging in
sexual acts that do not involve intercourse. In re John Z was a case where identity and
penetration were not at issue because the defendant admitted to engaging in the sexual activ-
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The prosecution can prove a victim's lack of consent by showing incapac-
ity to consent, direct or implied force or duress, intoxication, unconsciousness,
or fraudulent inducement.2 7 However, in a society where some have argued
that cultural attitudes toward intercourse, foreplay, and seduction include
notions of violence, dominance, and passivity,28 even credible evidence of
these indicators may be insufficient to prove a lack of meaningful consent.
This issue is particularly problematic in states that allow for a reasonable belief,
or reasonable mistake, of consent defense.29
2. Evolution of the Concept of Rape
Rape is an ancient crime. Yet despite the ancient roots, rape is an offense
that goes largely unreported.3 ° However, there has been a recent substantial
increase in public concern and legal reform that is generally associated with the
growth of the women's rights and feminist movements, as well as, the gradual
increase in the number of reported cases.'
The traditional notion of rape was that only a man could rape a woman
and only then if the woman was not his wife.32 Some jurisdictions now recog-
nize that men can rape men,33 husbands can rape their wives,34 women can
rape men,35 and women can rape women. 36 This evolution from a strictly male
ity. 60 P.3d 183, 185 (Cal. 2003). The victim initially consented to engaging in sexual acts
but protested when the defendant attempted intercourse. Id. at 184-85. The critical issue at
trial was whether a reasonable person would believe the victim continued to consent despite
her verbal withdrawal of consent coupled with physical resistance. Id. at 186-87. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that under such circumstances "a withdrawal of consent effec-
tively nullifies any earlier consent and subjects the male to forcible rape charges if he
persists in what has become nonconsensual intercourse." Id. at 184.
27 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2003).
28 See Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 41, 42-43 (1993) (arguing that equating violence with eroticism makes it diffi-
cult to distinguish rape from sex).
29 See, e.g., Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir. 1995); People v. Williams, 841 P.2d
961, 965 (Cal. 1992); Honeycutt v. State, 56 P.3d 362, 368 (Nev. 2002). But see Common-
wealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Mass. 2001) ("The mistake of fact defense is incom-
patible with the evolution of our jurisprudence with respect to the crime of rape.").
30 See CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, supra note 11, at 11 (Only 53.7% of rapes/sexual assaults
were reported in 2002.); Berger, supra note 22, at 5 (cautioning that when considering rape
statistics one must remember, "[rape is probably one of the most under-reported crimes").
31 See Dripps, supra note 22; Berger, supra note 22, at 2-7.
32 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a) (West 2003) ("Rape is an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator.").
33 For example, Nevada's sexual assault statute is non-gender specific and defines sexual
penetration as "cunnilingus, fellatio, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a per-
son's body." NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366 (2004). In Crowley v. State, 83 P.3d 282 (Nev.
2004), a male defendant was found guilty of sexual assault under NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.366 when he performed fellatio on a male victim. Note, in Nevada, the term "sexual
assault" is used in lieu of "rape."
" See, e.g., A.U.G. v. J.G., 300 A.D.2d 205 (N.Y. App. Div.-2002) (upholding the lower
court's grant of a temporary protective order based on finding that husband raped his wife).
35 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hitchcock, 565 A.2d 1159, 1162 (Pa. 1989) (Papadakos, J.,
concurring) ("A male can rape a female by his penetration of any of the victim's orifices; a
male can rape another male in the same fashion; and, similarly, a female can rape another
female or male as well."). But see, Green v. Wyrick, 462 F. Supp. 357, 361-62 (W.D. Mo.
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on female crime to a gender-neutral assault on the personal autonomy of one
"person" by another "person" is the result of the recognition that the essential
element that differentiates lawful intercourse from rape is a lack of meaningful
consent.
37
3. Rape Myths and Mindsets
Rape mythology has a substantial impact on the fairness of trial.38
Defense attorneys play to juror held misconceptions about females and the
crime of rape and use these common misconceptions to undermine the critical
concepts of consent and non-consent.39 Some common rape myths include the
belief that women really mean "yes" when they actually say "no," fabricate
allegations to cover up indiscretion, or "ask" for sex when they dress a certain
way, or frequent a particular type of establishment.4 ° These myths serve only
to bolster a defendant's claim that his accuser consented, or that, at the very
least, he reasonably believed his accuser had in fact consented. 4' To achieve
these ends, defense attorneys frame the presentation of the circumstances sur-
rounding the attack in a manner consistent with rape mythology so that the
evidence or testimony reinforces juror bias in favor of the defendant.42
One of the most difficult consent myths to overcome is the misconceived
notion that "real rape" produces visible proof of injury.4 3 When rape victims
"almost lose their life or sustain serious injuries, they have a strong case.""
However, in cases where there are no outward signs of physical trauma, the
defendant enjoys the presumption of innocence while the accuser battles the
1978) (asserting the body of law rejecting the argument that a females can effect rape is
"ever growing").
36 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 400 N.E.2d 821, 828-30 (Mass. 1980) (uphold-
ing female defendants' conviction for rape for performing cunnilingus on a female victim
without the victim's consent).
7 For a general discussion of a meaningful consent standard see Robin D. Wiener, Note,
Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape, 6 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 143 (1983).
38 See Morisson Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair
Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1013, 1040-41 (1991).
39 See id. at 1015.
40 See id. Torrey also notes several other myths, such as "[W]omen who 'tease' men
deserve to be raped; the majority of women who are raped are promiscuous ... ; women cry
rape to cover up an illegitimate pregnancy; a man is justified in forcing sex on a woman who
makes him sexually excited; ... [and] women derive pleasure from victimization." Id.
41 See generally id. at 1040-61 (describing the effect of rape mythology on trials).
42 See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 106 (1999) ("A
lawyer who fails to appeal to race or gender bias will start losing cases if biased appeals
work with juries."). In keeping with that assertion, at trial a defense attorney may attempt to
elicit testimony regarding the nature of the location (e.g. a singles bar, club), and the clothes
worn (e.g. short skirt, tight clothing). The purpose is to cause a juror to infer the worst about
the victim from the attendant circumstances. Thus, defense counsel can present rape myth
reinforcing evidence without actually saying, "you were asking for it!"
13 LEE MADIGAN & NANCY C. GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY'S CONTINUED
BETRAYAL OF THE VIC-rIM 95 (1991) ("The myth that a real victim should be found lying
crumpled on the ground in a pool of blood is still alive and well.").
44 Id.
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presumptions of consent,45 male innocence, female guilt, and consensual rough
sex.
46
4. Swearing Contest
In light of preconceived notions established by rape mythology, the rape
victim that does not exhibit physical signs of violence often finds herself at a
distinct disadvantage when the trial degenerates into a swearing contest, or a
case of she-said-he-said. 47 The male offender can admit that he engaged in
intercourse with his accuser and assert consent, all without fear of social stig-
matization.48 The female victim, however, must prove that while intercourse
occurred, it occurred without her consent, and she must do so while trying to
overcome the preconceived notions established by rape mythology.4 9
5. Legal Progress in Overcoming the Burden on the Victim
Changing social awareness regarding the crime of rape has resulted in the
reduction of the burden on the victim at trial. As one scholar has noted, "[o]ur
sexual culture has changed. Prosecutors sometimes file charges and juries
sometimes convict in cases that would have been laughed out of court twenty
or thirty years ago."5° Proof of rape at trial no longer requires corroboration.5'
Furthermore, rape shield laws now exist to prevent the defense from further
victimizing the accuser on the stand, and federal and state governments have
enacted victims' rights legislation to protect the victim's interest before, during,
and after trial.52
B. Victims' Rights Legislation
As a response to the evolving concepts of rape and consent, as well as a
growing awareness of the social and personal costs of victimization and the role
of the victim in the legal system, Congress, and numerous state legislatures,
developed laws to protect the rights of victims.53 However, while many of
"5 See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U.L. REV. 663, 692 (1999) ("The
history of rape prosecutions is replete with illegitimate dismissals of women's testimony and
ridiculous presumptions of consent.").
46 See Henderson, supra note 28, at 42-43.
" See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Criminal Law: Rape in the Criminal Justice
System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1382 (1997) ("We found that the prosecution
[in rape cases] is at a disadvantage in pure swearing contests.").
48 See Stephen Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 22, 1998, at 55, 57.
In his piece, Schulhofer notes that the obstacle in a case where consent is asserted as a
defense "is not conflicting versions of the truth or questions of credibility. The man can
admit to the facts, more or less with impunity." Id.
" See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
50 Schulhofer, supra note 48, at 55-56. However, "the law itself continues to pose obsta-
cles, blocking enforcement and denying remedies even when juries are prepared to condemn
defendants' conduct as outrageous." Id.
51 See, e.g., CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL (CALJIC) 10.60 (7th ed. 2005) ("It is not
essential to a finding of guilt on a charge of rape that the testimony of the witness with
whom sexual relations is alleged to have been committed be corroborated by other
evidence.").
52 See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
53 Id.
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these legislative efforts successfully created rights for victims, many failed to
address adequately who in fact qualifies as a victim or when that person may be
classified as a victim. This shortfall is a critical oversight and merits immediate
attention.
1. Victims' Rights Legislation/Victims' Bill of Rights
Many state legislatures have enacted statutory provisions or constitutional
amendments to provide rights to victims.54 However, efforts to pass a federal
constitutional amendment to provide victim's rights, remedies, and protections
against the criminal justice system have failed and are often vehemently
opposed by constitutional conservatives." Nonetheless, Congress has success-
fully passed several victims' rights statutes.56
2. Purpose of Victims' Rights Legislation
The common purpose of most victims' rights legislation is the enhance-
ment and protection of the "necessary role of crime victims and witnesses in
the criminal justice process" without "infringing on the constitutional rights of
the defendant."57 As noted by the drafters of the Uniform Victims of Crime
Act of 1992, victims' rights legislation seeks to strike a balance in an overly
offender-focused criminal system that fails to protect victims who are forced to
participate "through no fault of their own. "58 Yet despite their noble purposes,
those who believe the protection of victims violates the constitutional protec-
tions afforded to defendants often challenge the constitutionality of victims'
rights provisions.5 9
54 For a comprehensive list of state victims' rights constitutional amendments and statutory
provisions see Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Constitutional or Statutory Victims' Bill of Rights, 91 A.L.R.5TH 343 (2003).
55 See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Exploiting Trauma: The So-Called Victim's Rights Amend-
ment, NEV. LAW., Apr. 2001, at 18, 18-19 (arguing that "the Constitution should be amended
only when necessary," and that a victim's rights amendment is unnecessary because state
and federal "legislation can accomplish most of what the [proposed] amendment provides").
56 See, e.g., Justice for All Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (West. Supp. 2004); Victim
Rights Clarification Act of 1997, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3510, 3593 (2000); Victims of Crime Act of
1984 (VOCA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10608 (2000); Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982 (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000).
57 Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 2(a)(2), 96 Stat. 1248,
(1982). "All too often the victim of a serious crime is forced to suffer physical, psychologi-
cal, or financial hardship first as a result of the criminal act and then as a result of contract
with a criminal justice system unresponsive to the real needs of such victim." Id.
58 UNIF. VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT summary of contents (1992), 11 U.L.A. 240 (2003).
-5 See, e.g., Rachel King, Why A Victims' Rights Constitutional Amendment is a Bad Idea:
Practical Experiences From Crime Victims, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 362 (2000). "[U]nder
our adversarial system, it is vital to remember that it is the defendant, not the victim, who is
at risk of losing life, liberty and property." Id. at 402. King argues that any harm a victim
may incur during the criminal adjudication process pales in comparison the potential loss the
defendant faces. "We must guard against the tendency towards diminution of the rights of
the accused in an effort to be tough on crime, or sympathetic to victims." Id.
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3. What Victim's Rights Accrue?
The rights that accrue often vary from state to state, but as one legal
scholar noted, those rights typically include provisions for pretrial detention,
speedy trial, victim participation in plea bargaining and sentencing, evidentiary
rules, and restitution.60 For example, the Nevada Constitution provides that,
upon written request, the victim shall be notified of the "status or disposition of
a criminal proceeding,' the victim may be present at any public hearing,62
and the victim has the right to be heard at all sentencing or release
proceedings.63
4. When Do Victim's Rights Accrue?
In most victims' rights legislation, a victim's rights accrue regardless of
successful adjudication of a claim.64 The very nature of the rights and reme-
dies afforded requires that certain rights accrue prior to final disposition of the
criminal case. A victim cannot participate in the plea bargaining process if the
rights do not accrue until the jury returns a "guilty" verdict. Therefore, gener-
ally, a crime victim's rights accrue independent of the facts of the alleged
crime, including any defense asserted, or the conviction of the defendant.
The issue of when a victim's rights accrue arose in Florida when a victim
of sexual assault was present during the trial of her attacker pursuant to a Flor-
ida Victims' Rights provision.6 5 On appeal, the defendant in Bellamy v. State66
argued that since the court had not yet found him guilty, and because his
asserted defense was consent, which drew into question the validity of the
accusation, his accuser was not yet a victim, and the court's failure to exclude
her from the courtroom violated his presumption of innocence.6 7 The appeals
court held that such construction of the word victim "would undermine the
purpose of the victim's rights ... amendment," such that it would produce an
absurd result, and would not accomplish the intent and purpose of the people.6 8
Thus, though there had not been a final entry of judgment, and though defen-
dant claimed consent as a defense, in terms of the victims' rights legislation,
the rights of the victim had accrued and her presence in the courtroom, in
accordance with those rights, did not violate the defendant's presumption of
69innocence.
It is this struggle to define who is a victim and determine when a victim's
rights accrue, taken in conjunction with the evolving concept of the crime of
rape, that contribute to, and complicate, the analysis that takes place when a
defendant accused of rape seeks to preclude the use of the term victim during
60 Lynne Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 967 (1985)
(internal citations omitted).
61 NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2(a); NEV. REv. STAT. § 176.015(4)(d) (2004).
62 NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2(b); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.015(3)(a).
63 NEV. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 2(c); NEV. REV, STAT. § 176.015(3)(b).
64 See, e.g., UNIF. VICTIMs OF CRIME ACT § 101 cmt. crime (1992), 11 U.L.A. 245 (2003).
65 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b).
66 594 So. 2d 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
67 Id. at 338.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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trial. However, courts considering this issue cannot allow gender inequality to
continue to taint the prosecution of sex crimes and must give proper weight to
evolving notions of meaningful consent and the impact of rape mythology on
jury deliberations.
III. ANALYSIS
Consider the following hypothetical. Sexual intercourse between a
woman and a man has occurred. She says it was rape; he says it was consen-
sual. The woman exhibits no outward signs of physical injury or trauma: no
bruising, no lacerations, and no broken bones. She files a complaint, the state
files charges, and as trial approaches, each side begins filing a multitude of pre-
trial motions. Assuming the victim's allegations are true, she is about to endure
what some commentators have characterized as her second-rape at the hands of
the defendant.7 °
The challenge she faces is that, given general social predisposition to rape
myths, without overt indicia of force or coercion her allegations are presump-
tively suspect. 7 1 By asserting the act was consensual, the defendant puts the
victim on trial before criminal proceedings begin. The defense will likely
argue that she is not yet a victim, that reference to her as such violates the
defendant's presumption of innocence, is prejudicial, and is an improper
expression of a personal belief in her veracity and the defendant's guilt.
72
The court's final resolution of the victim reference issue affects the trial
and the justice system in many ways. The impact on the victim can be substan-
tial. Conceivably, resolution in favor of the defense may cause the victim to
withdraw from the process altogether, effectively terminating the case.7 3 If she
chooses to stay the course, she may doubt her role at trial, her value, and her
status in the system.7 ' Furthermore, the action the court takes may serve to
discourage outside observers, and victims past, present, and future, from report-
ing sex crimes perpetrated against them, for fear of being subject to similar
tribulations.7 5
Conversely, the effect on the defendant, though he would have the court
believe otherwise, is marginal. If the court allows the prosecution and wit-
71 See generally Madigan & Gamble, supra note 43; Berger, supra note 22.
71 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., Mr. Bryant's Motion to Preclude References to the Accuser as the "Victim"
("Defense Motion") People v. Bryant (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2004) (No. 03 CR 204), available at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/exec/media/eagle/05-04/motion.pdf.
73 See generally Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer:
Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REv. 907, 931-32
(2001) (arguing that the undue influence of legal actors and social pressures cause rape
victims to withdraw from the prosecutorial process).
" See generally Christine Kenmore, Note, The Admissibility of Extrajudicial Rape Com-
plaints, 64 B.U. L. REV. 199, 224-25 (1984) (noting "the victim's fear of court procedures
was the second most frequently cited reason for the victim's failure to cooperate after having
reported a rape" and that a "victim's fear of the trial process" was the "major reason for
withdrawing a complaint once filed").
71 See Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating that dis-
counting a sexual assault victim's credibility at the outset would discourage the reporting of
such incidents).
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nesses to refer to the victim as the victim, it is highly unlikely that such refer-
ence alone will serve to establish, in the minds of the jurors, the government's
case beyond a reasonable doubt.76 Likewise, it is unlikely that precluding use
of the term victim would be the critical element that enables the defendant to
triumph over prejudicial evidence of his guilt.
So why does it matter? It matters because defendants should not have a
monopoly on notions of fairness in the criminal justice system. Justice also
belongs to victims and society as a whole. A conviction based on facts proven
beyond a reasonable doubt reinforces social norms and reaffirms society's
abhorrence for the crime of rape.7 7
In order to analyze this issue properly, this Note will first consider who is
a victim, and then it will address the common arguments for and against use of
the term victim at trial. In doing so, this Note will consider use of the word
victim in terms of due process, presumption of innocence, improper expression
of veracity or guilt, and invasion of the province of the jury. Finally, this Note
will consider the available options for trials where rape is the crime and consent
is the defense.
A. Who is a Victim?
Ascertaining who is in fact a victim in any criminal context is difficult.
"The law of crime victim compensation has for more than thirty years struggled
with the question of who counts as a true victim of crime."7 8 State criminal
statutes offer little assistance,7" often defining victim, if at all, in an ad hoc and
inconsistent manner.8" Federal legislation is often equally ineffective. For
example, the Victim and Witness Protection Act,8 ' an act that purports to pro-
vide protection and assistance to victims and witness, "neither defined 'victim'
nor distinguished between victims and witnesses in principle. 82
While state and federal statutes have attempted to define the word victim,
neither has made the status contingent on the successful adjudication of the
victim's claim or the defendant's conviction. For example, the Justice for All
Act of 2004, defined victim as "a person directly and proximately harmed as a
result of the commission of a Federal offense." 83 Black's Law Dictionary
defines victim as a "person harmed by a crime, tort, or other wrong."84 The
76 See State v. Nomura, 903 P.2d 718, 723 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995) (holding use of the term
victim in jury instructions on elements "would not have had a substantial influence upon the
jury's verdict and thus, the error was harmless").
77 United States v. Doss, 15 M.J. 409, 412 (C.M.A. 1983) ("[E]ach criminal conviction
itself represents a pronouncement by the State that the defendant has engaged in conduct
warranting the moral condemnation of the community.") (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404-405 (1958)).
78 MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VIC-
TIMS' RJGHTS 158 (2002).
79 See Schulhofer, supra note 48, at 55-56. "Criminal law's most obvious weak spot is its
continuing vagueness-a surprise after all the effort devoted to reform." Id. at 56.
80 UNIF. VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT summary of contents (1992), 11 U.L.A. 240 (2003).
"There is great inconsistency among the states on the definition of 'victim.'" Id.
81 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000).
82 DUBBER, supra note 78, at 211.
83 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (2000).
84 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1598 (8th ed. 2004).
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Uniform Victims of Crime Act ("UCVA") states that a victim is a "person
against whom a crime has been committed. ' 5 The UCVA further qualifies
this definition by stating that, "[t]here is no requirement that a defendant be
successfully prosecuted or even identified for a victim to be entitled to the
rights under this Act."86
Using successful adjudication as a victim status determinate is unsound.
The rationale for the noted absence of a statutory conviction requirement is
clear: some victims may never identify their assailant. Furthermore, when the
victim can identify the assailant, the assailant may never be caught, and even if
caught, may never be brought to trial. 81 If state and federal entities made suc-
cessful adjudication of a claim the determinative factor in establishing the sta-
tus of a victim as a victim, the rights of many victims would never accrue.
Consequently, some legitimate victims would never be entitled to rights and
compensatory benefits provided by victims' rights legislation. In fact, based on
current crime statistics, such a requirement would effectively deny rights, resti-
tution, counseling, and care to an estimated ninety-four percent of rape victims
because the claim never ripened into a criminal conviction for the assailant.88
One must also consider that, contrary to some conventionally held notions,
a verdict of "not guilty" is not always a declaration of the defendant's inno-
cence. While innocence is one possible reason for a "not guilty" verdict, juries
also return "not guilty" verdicts because the government failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt one or more of the elements of the charged offense or
because the jurors decided to engage in jury nullification.8 9
Imagine, for example, the woman who meets a man and returns with him
to her home with nothing but the purest of intentions. The man, however, sees
this offer of hospitality as an invitation to engage in sexual intercourse. The
woman resists, makes her lack of consent clear and unequivocal, but is unable
to fend off his assault. At this point, from an omniscient perch, few would
deny that the woman in this scenario is a victim and should be regarded as
such.
Now imagine that following the attack she reports the incident to local law
enforcement personnel who observe that she does not exhibit any signs of visi-
ble trauma. However, based on the victim's statement, the district attorney
files charges. At trial, the attacker asserts that the intercourse was consensual.
Despite its best efforts, the government fails to prove beyond a reasonable
8' UNIF. VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT § 101(6) (1992), 11 U.L.A. 245 (2003). See also 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 145/2.3 (West 2004) ("Victim means a person killed or physically injured
in this State as a result of a crime perpetrated or attempted against that person."); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.752(1)(j)(i) (West 2005) (A victim is "an individual who suffers
direct or threatened physical, financial or emotional harm as a result of the commission of a
crime."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.015(5)(b) (2004) ("'Victim' includes a person ... against
whom a crime has been committed [or] who has been injured or killed as a direct result of
the commission of a crime.").
86 UNIF. VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT § 101 cmt. crime (1992), 11 U.L.A. 245 (2003).
87 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
89 Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 456 & n.31
(2001). Raymond argues that a verdict of "not guilty" may be the result of "burden of proof
innocence," "legal innocence," or "factual innocence." Id.
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doubt that the victim did not consent to the penetration. There are no witnesses
other than the defendant and the victim, and there is no evidence of physical
injury. As the system requires, the jury returns a verdict of "not guilty."
In this situation, under a system that makes successful adjudication deter-
minative of victim status, the legitimate victim is no longer a victim. What
then, has she become? At best, she is a victim of circumstance. At worst, she
is a liar. Unfortunately, the logical consequence of such a system is that the
state should then consider perjury charges and deny her care and counseling.
Thus, under a system that uses conviction as a determinate of victim status, the
victim who is able to identify her assailant-who is subsequently caught and
charged-is treated differently from the victims who cannot identify their
assailants, the victims whose assailants-identified and caught-are not
charged, and those victims whose assailants are caught and charged but not
convicted.
The decision of the Eagle County Colorado District Court in People v.
Bryant demonstrates the problem of victim status determination. There the
court held that Kobe Bryant's accuser was a victim for purposes of Colorado's
victims' rights statutes. 90 The court afforded her many of the common rights
associated with victims' rights legislation.9 However, though the court held
she was a victim for victims' rights purposes, Judge Ruckriegle also ordered
that neither the prosecution, nor the witnesses, could refer to the victim as the
victim during trial.9" The court stated that though Colorado's criminal statute
for rape defined victim as a "person alleging to have been subjected to a crimi-
nal sexual assault,"9 3 the definition was not "generally known" and the com-
mon understanding of the term victim implies the crime has occurred.9 4
Essentially, the court held that the victim would not be a victim in the eyes of
the people of Colorado until the jury convicted Bryant of the charge of rape.
Thus, by holding that the victim would be a victim for victims' rights purposes
but not for trial, the court inappropriately applied the conviction as a determi-
nate of status standard.95
However, it is the trial process, first and foremost, where the courts should
consider a victim a victim until proven otherwise. Courts should not make
criminal conviction a victim status determinate when the statutes that provide
redress and remedy to victims do not make successful adjudication a require-
ment. To hold otherwise creates absurd results, undermines the purpose of vic-
90 See Order Re People's Motion for In Camera Proceedings for the Protection of Victim's
Rights Re: People's Motion In Limine: Medical and Mental Health History of the Victim
(Colo. Dist. Ct. 2004) (No. 03 CR 204); Motion for In Camera Proceedings for the Protec-
tion of Victim's Rights Re: People's Motion In Limine Re: Any Evidence of Drug or Alco-
hol Use (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2004) (No. 03 CR 204), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/
exec/media/eagle/04-04/order2.pdf.
91 Id.
92 See Order, Bryant (No. 03 CR 204), supra note 4.
93 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-3-401(7).
14 See Order, Bryant (No. 03 CR 204), supra note 4.
15 The problem with the court's reasoning here is that it gives preference to conventional
definition over legal definitions and assumes that a jury instruction to the contrary would be
insufficient. This logic belies the purpose of jury instructions and statutory definitions, and
does so based on unfounded presumptions about the ability of the jurors to comprehend
those definitions and instructions.
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tims' rights legislation, and unfairly treats rape victims with unknown
assailants, or assailants that have not been apprehended or convicted, differ-
ently from rape victims with known assailants.
B. When Remarks Made at Trial Should Be Suppressed-Defendant's Due
Process
Defense counsel in rape trials where consent is the asserted defense often
argue that the court should preclude reference to the accuser as the victim,
because such references cause the jury to infer that a crime has been perpe-
trated and the defendant is guilty.9 6 The general rule established by the
Supreme Court regarding the admissibility of statements made at trial is that if
the remarks would result in unfairness, cause a denial of due process, or are an
attempt to manipulate or misstate the character of evidence, those remarks
would be unfairly prejudicial and a court may properly exclude them.9 7 How-
ever, during such an analysis, courts "should not lightly infer" that a jury will
attribute the most damaging meaning to an ambiguous remark when there are
many other less damaging meanings.98
1. Unfairness and Denial of Due Process
Virtually all evidence is prejudicial. "If it were not, the prosecution would
not be introducing it." 99 However, to justify exclusion under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403,1" the prejudice must be unfair, and that unfairness must sub-
stantially outweigh the probative value. When the unfairness relates to com-
ments made by the prosecution or its witnesses at trial, the defendant must
show that the unfairness was more than the result of some implication or infer-
ence drawn from the actual statement. 10 1 Thus, the bar in such a claim is high.
For example, in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,10 2 during closing arguments,
the prosecutor argued that even though the defense asked the jury to find the
defendant not guilty, the defense in reality hoped the jury would find the defen-
dant guilty of something; just not first-degree murder. 10 3 On appeal, the
defense argued the prosecution meant to imply that the accused offered to plead
guilty along with two of his counterparts, and therefore, the prosecution
unfairly denied the defendant his right to due process.'" 4 The Court reasoned
that it was illogical "to conclude that the jury would accept any implied argu-
ment of the prosecutor that ... the defendant was any less firm in his assertion
96 See, e.g., Defense Motion, Bryant (No. 03 CR 204), supra note 72.
97 See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637, 643 (1974).
98 Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647.
99 United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 162 F.3d 698, 705 (1st Cir. 1998).
1oo FED. R. EvID. 403 provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
1 See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643-44.
102 Id. at 637.
103 Id. at 640.
104 Id. at 643-44.
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that he himself was not guilty of any crime whatsoever."' 0 5 Rather, the rele-
vant issue was whether the prosecutor's comments, "so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."'
0 6
Had the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments been of such a
character as to infringe impermissibly on specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, they may have resulted in a denial of due process.' 0 7 For example, in
Miller v. Pate,"'8 the prosecution's description of paint stained shorts as blood
stained shorts despite knowledge to the contrary was a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and thus was a denial of the defendant's due process.'0 9 In
Donnelly, however, the prosecution's closing argument was opinion, not evi-
dence, and did "not reach the same proportions [as Miller]"'"'o and hence, was
not so unfair as to result in a denial of due process.
While mischaracterization of evidence may result in unfair prejudice, use
of the term victim by a defendant's own counsel does not rise to the level
necessary to result in a denial of due process."' An appeals court in Ohio
upheld the conviction of a defendant for two counts of rape though at trial his
attorney referred to the victim as the victim."' The defendant's claim that his
attorney's actions resulted in a denial of a fair trial were deemed "groundless
and without merit.""' 3 While the appeals court did suggest courts "should
refrain from using the term 'victim,'" it stated that the use of the term "by the
court, prosecutor, and defense counsel" does not affect a defendant's substan-
tial rights and therefore is not error. 14
Reference to the victim as the victim by the government at trial is not a
knowing mischaracterization of evidence and is not an assertion that defendant
is guilty. The use of the term victim is akin to the use of the term defendant.
Neither term implies the accused believes he is guilty. Rather, when the gov-
ernment or its witnesses refer to the victim as the victim, or the defendant as the
defendant, it simply denotes their status at that point in the trial. Thus, under
Donnelly, the government should not be precluded from making such reference
to the victim at trial.
2. Inflammatory Remarks
Inflammatory remarks by the prosecution are not necessarily sufficient to
establish a due process violation. In Darden v. Wainwright,"1 5 the Supreme
Court held that though the prosecution referred to the defendant as an "animal"
and argued that only the imposition of the death penalty would guarantee the
defendant would not commit similar crimes in the future, the remark, while
101 Id. at 644.
106 Id. at 643.
107 Id. at 643 & n.15.
108 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
109 Id. at 6-7.
11o Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 646.
"I See State v. Wright, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3208, *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
112 Id.
13 Id. at *5.
114 Id.
"1 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
[Vol. 6:248
WHEN A VICTIM'S A VICTIM
inflammatory, "did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did it implicate
other specific rights of the accused."
1 16
Reference to the victim in a rape trial as the victim is not an inflammatory
remark directed at the defendant. It is not an attempt to manipulate or misstate
the nature of evidence. Again, such a reference merely reflects the status of the
victim at that point in the trial. Furthermore, any effect the term victim may
have on the jury pales in comparison to the effect of referring to the defendant
as an "animal" that should be put to death to prevent future crimes. Thus,
within the reasoning of Darden, use of the term victim should not be precluded.
C. Defendant's Presumption of Innocence
Another common argument of defense counsel, in a rape trial where the
defendant asserts consent, is that reference to the victim as the victim is viola-
tive of the defendant's presumption of innocence. The presumption of inno-
cence is an essential element of a fair criminal trial." 7 The government's
requirement to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt is derived from the
principle of a defendant's presumption of innocence.' 1
8
However, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
mandate an instruction on the presumption of innocence.1" 9 Thus, a court's
failure to provide such an instruction "does not in and of itself violate the Con-
stitution." '2 0 Rather, to determine whether the defendant received a fair trial in
accordance with the presumption of innocence the court must consider "the
totality of the circumstances." 121 When making such a determination, jury
instructions and arguments presented by both the prosecution and the defense
are but two of the relevant factors that the court should take into
consideration. 1
22
The court may also consider whether the government proved its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. 123 The burden of proving guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt "provides concrete substance" to the presumption of innocence prin-
ciple. ' 4 The purpose of the reasonable doubt standard is to reduce "the risk of
convictions resting on factual error."' 1
25
The primary basis for the defense argument that reference to the victim as
the victim violates the presumption of innocence is the assertion that the term
victim implies that a crime has already occurred and thus creates a bias in the
116 Id. at 179-82.
''7 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of innocence, although
not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of
criminal justice.").
118 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) cited with approval in United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738, 748 (2005).
"9 Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979).
120 Id.
121 id.
122 Id.
123 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362.
124 Id. at 363.
125 Id.
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mind of the fact finder, relieving the government of its burden to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt.126
If this assertion were accurate, the government would only have to point to
the victim in the courtroom during its opening arguments and proclaim, "She is
the victim of rape." Consequently, the government would be relieved of its
burden to prove penetration and lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.
The jury would infer from the proclamation of her status that it was in fact the
defendant who perpetrated the crime against her, and there would be little left,
in the way of evidence, to explore.
However, as already noted, courts should not lightly infer that the jury will
assume the most damaging meaning when the government and its witnesses
refer to the victim as the victim. 127 The government's burden, at a rape trial, is
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a penetration occurred and that it
occurred without the consent of the victim.128 Thus, when charged, the court
instructs the jury to consider all the evidence and determine whether the gov-
ernment proved those elements beyond a reasonable doubt.129
Under the totality of the circumstances,13 it is unlikely that the prosecu-
tion's use of the term victim will create the risk of conviction based on factual
error."' Because use of the term victim is insufficient to prove any element of
rape beyond a reasonable doubt, the government is not relieved of its burden of
proof through its use, and therefore, under In re Winship, 13 2 the presumption of
innocence is not violated.
D. Improper Expression of Veracity or Guilt
Officers of the court must not express their personal belief as to the verac-
ity of a witness or the guilt of the defendant. As the Supreme Court noted in
United States v. Young,' 33 "[t]he line separating acceptable from improper
advocacy is not easily drawn .... Prosecutors sometimes breach their duty to
refrain from overzealous conduct by commenting on the defendant's guilt and
offering unsolicited personal views on the evidence."' 34 In Young, the Court,
citing to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, stated that it was unprofessional conduct for an officer of the court to
present a personal opinion as to the falsity or veracity of any evidence or testi-
126 See, e.g., Defense Motion, Bryant (No. 03 CR 204), supra note 72. The defense
asserted that use of the term victim was calculated to create prejudice against the accused by
implying the accuser was in fact raped and thus was a victim. Id.
127 See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974).
128 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
129 See, e.g., CAL. JURY INSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL (CALJIC) 10.65 (7th ed. 2005) ("If after a
consideration of all of the evidence you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
criminal intent at the time of the accused sexual activity, you must find [him] [her] not guilty
of the crime.").
13o Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979).
131 See, e.g., State v. Nomura, 903 P.2d 718, 723 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995).
132 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
133 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
13, Id. at 7.
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mony, or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.135 Such an expression
may lead to unfair prejudice because the jury may be inclined to lend added
weight to the opinion of the officer of the court, or the jury may believe the
opinion is based on the officer's access to extra-judicial information. 136
In this vein, another argument proffered by defense counsel in People v.
Bryant was that any reference to the accuser as the victim would be an
improper expression of a personal belief in the veracity of the victim or the
guilt of the defendant. 137 This argument, once more, hinges on the assertion
that the term victim implies lack of consent and that the prosecution's reference
to the victim as the victim equates to a personal opinion, the expression of
which denies the defendant the right to be judged solely on the basis of the
evidence presented at trial. It also relies on the assumption that the allegations
of female accusers in rape trials where consent is the defense should be consid-
ered suspect until final adjudication of the matter.
However, the term victim does not connote that the victim is more or less
truthful. A person who alleges a crime was committed is, at the outset, deemed
neither credible nor incredible. In general, victim-witnesses are afforded a pre-
sumption of credibility. For example, law enforcement personnel are author-
ized to make an arrest based on a citizen complaint without corroboration or
investigation of truthfulness,' 3 ' particularly when the individual reporting the
incident is a victim-witness.' 3 9
When the victim-witness alleges a sexual assault has occurred, the pre-
sumption of credibility of the complaint and the witness is particularly impor-
tant. The Tenth Circuit, in Easton v. City of Boulder,4 ° stated that discounting
the credibility of a sexual assault victim's testimony at the outset "would only
serve to discourage [victims] from reporting [such] incidents and to unjustly
insulate the perpetrator of such crimes from prosecution."' 4
However, the presumption of credibility for sexual assault victims, in par-
ticular rape victims, as noted supra, was not always the prevailing the view.' 42
As one scholar points out, "the singularity of the law of rape stems mainly from
a deep distrust of the female accuser."' 4 3 In fact, until 1975, California
required that in all sexual assault cases the jury be instructed as follows:
A charge such as that made against the defendant in this case is one which is easily
made and, once made, difficult to defend against, even if the person accused is inno-
135 See id. at 8-11.
136 See United States v. Moore, 710 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1983).
17 Defense Motion, Bryant (No. 03 CR 204), supra note 72.
i38 See, e.g., Guzell v. Hiller, 223 F.3d 518, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Police are entitled to
base an arrest on a citizen complaint, whether of a victim ... or a nonvictim witness, without
investigating the truthfulness of the complaint, unless . . .they have reason to believe it's
fishy.").
139 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 3.4(a) (3d ed. 1996) (noting that "by far
the prevailing view" is that corroboration is not essential in victim-witness cases, and argu-
ing "that when an average citizen tenders information to the police, the police should be
permitted to assume that they are dealing with a credible person in the absence of special
circumstances suggesting that such may not be the case").
140 776 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1985).
141 Id. at 1449.
142 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
143 Berger, supra note 22, at 10.
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cent. Therefore, the law requires that you examine the testimony of the female per-
son named in the information with caution. 144
That instruction, given in People v. Rincon-Pineda, was coupled with evi-
dence of the victim's sexual history proffered by the defense to show that the
victim was of "unchaste character."'' 45 Evidence of the victim's "unchaste
character" was presented to attack her veracity by asserting "a woman who has
previously consented to sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent
again."' 4 6 In this respect, the defense argued that the credibility of such a
woman should be considered in light of her unchaste activities'4 7 making the
suggestion to the jury that a woman who consents to intercourse is not as credi-
ble as a woman who has never engaged in consensual sexual activities.
The California Supreme Court, however, found no evidence to suggest,
"juries should be instructed that those who claim to be victims of sexual
offenses are presumptively entitled to less credence than those who testify as
the alleged victims of other crimes."' 4 8 Instead, the court held that the veracity
of the victim-witness should be considered in light of the "circumstances of the
alleged crime" and the witness's demeanor and presentation of testimony at
trial. 149
In a rape trial, reference to the victim as the victim is not an improper
expression of veracity or guilt. By making such a reference, the prosecution is
not stating a personal belief that the victim-witness is veracious or that the
defendant is guilty. Just as the defendant is afforded a presumption of inno-
cence, the victim in a rape trial is afforded a presumption of credibility and it is
the province of the jury to evaluate the sufficiency of that presumption. 1" °
A court's instruction on the presumption of veracity of witness testimony
does not deprive a defendant of his presumption of innocence, nor does it
relieve the government of its burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.15  However, the presumption of veracity is rebuttable.152 Still, some
courts, such as the court in People v. Bryant, have decided that this principle
does not apply to female victims in rape trials.'
5 3
Efforts by courts to reach a middle ground by allowing use of the term
alleged victim still undercut the presumption of veracity. The use of the word
144 People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247, 252 (Cal. 1975).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 256.
149 Id.
150 See Donnelly v. DiChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974).
I5' d. at 645 (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973) (holding that an
instruction on the presumption of truthfulness, if accompanied by an instruction on the gov-
ernment's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficiently preserved the
jury's function in assessing the credibility of witness testimony)).
15 See, e.g., Ballard v. Meyers, 572 S.E.2d 572, 576 (Ga. 2002) ("[T]he controlling pre-
sumption is that all witnesses speak the truth" but such a presumption may be rebutted with
contradictory evidence). "Every witness is presumed to speak the truth. The presumption
may be overcome by the manner in which the witness testifies, by the nature of his or her
testimony, by evidence affecting his or her character, interest or motives, by contradictory
evidence." United States v. Arias-Villanueva, 998 F.2d 1491. 1505 (9th Cir. 1993).
113 See Order, Bryant (No. 03 CR 204), supra note 4.
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alleged to modify victim conveys the same, or at best tempered, skepticism as
complete preclusion of in-trial reference to the victim as the victim. The use of
the term alleged qualifies the noun it modifies by implying the object is not, or
may not be, what is asserted.' 5 4 In this vein, one military court of appeals
preferred the term alleged victim in a sexual assault case because "they're not
victims until someone decides they're victims."' 55 However, this implication
of doubt by the court violates the presumption of veracity afforded to victim-
witnesses. "'
Generally, one cannot consent to be the victim of a crime. As a result, the
accuser in any crime other than rape is generally not presumptively relegated to
the status of alleged victim.' 1' If, for instance, the accuser states that personal
property is missing and that the defendant committed the theft, the accuser is
considered a victim.' 58 Upon conclusion of the trial, the jury will determine
the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but the accuser's status as a victim is
never called into question unless evidence to the contrary is presented. 159 Even
the defense in People v. Bryant recognized this, admitting that "[in many crim-
inal cases-for example, in most homicide cases-there is no dispute about
whether a crime was committed or whether the alleged victim was, in fact, a
,victim.""" However, the effect of the court's order, in People v. Bryant, to
use the term alleged victim was to reinforce historical rape mythology-allega-
tions of rape are easily made, hard to prove, and harder to defend against.' 6 '
This is not to say that the tension between the presumptions of credibility
and innocence should not be preserved in an adversarial system such as ours.
The prosecution cannot rightfully assert that the defendant's presumption of
innocence violates the victim's presumption of credibility, though inherently it
does. Conversely, the court cannot allow the defendant's presumption of inno-
cence to supplant a victim-witness's presumption of veracity. The victim
should not be forced to prove she is a victim because the defendant claims
consent. To hold otherwise would allow the defendant to control the status of a
victim-witness by virtue of the nature of his defense. The victim does not, and
should not, carry the burden of proving her status beyond a reasonable doubt to
earn the rights of a victim and a presumption of credibility. Rather, it is the
1' See Mittleman v. U. S. Treasury, 773 F. Supp. 442, 446 n2 (D.D.C. 1991) (use of
"alleged" in the complaint qualified the facts); In re Caldwell, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6351,
*7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1999) (court used the term "alleged father" when paternity was
in doubt). But see, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining alleged as
"[a]sserted to be true as described").
... United States v. Underwood, 47 M.J. 805, 809 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1997).
156 See supra text notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
157 See generally Estrich, supra note 18 (arguing that unlike crimes such as trespass or
robbery, rape victims are shouldered with the burden of proving lack of consent or forced to
overcome a presumption of diminished credibility).
158 id.
159 For example, if the victim is shown to have remained in possession of the missing prop-
erty, and to have never been deprived of possession of the property, the victim will cease to
be considered a victim.
160 Defense Motion, Bryant (No. 03 CR 204), supra note 72.
161 Estrich, supra note 18, at 1094-95 (quoting Matthew Hale, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 635 (1778)).
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jury's role to determine which presumption will prevail once each side presents
all the evidence.
E. Invasion of the Province of the Jury
It is the province of the jury to determine credibility1 62 and evaluate the
sufficiency of the evidence. 163 In People v. Bryant, the defense argued that
reference to the victim a thd victim invades the province of the jury by inter-
fering with the jury's role in evaluating-the evidence." 6  There the defense
argued that the term victim was conclusive in nature, effecting a predetermina-
tion that a crime has in fact occurred. 1 65
Once again, the argument relies heavily on the assertion that a jury will
"draw meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations," an argu-
ment the Supreme Court has already rejected, 16 6 or that the term victim is so
value laden that the jury will perceive the government's use of the term as a
personal expression of the victim's veracity or the defendant's guilt. However,
given that the conventional definition of the term victim, as well as the defini-
tions included in victims' rights legislation, 16 7 are not so value laden, a court
"should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have
its most damaging meaning."' 1
6 1
The jury is entrusted to assess credibility, weigh the sufficiency of the
evidence, and determine whether a defendant will be deprived of life, liberty, or
property. 169 If the jury can be entrusted with such a substantial responsibility,
then, just as the jury is trusted to understand that the term defendant does not
imply guilt, the jury should also be trusted to understand that the term victim
does not imply veracity or lend credibility to the testimony.
The jury determines which facts have been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and applies those facts to the law.171 It is unreasonable to infer that a
jury would abandon the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, and likewise
the presumption of innocence, because it was somehow involuntarily swayed
by the government's use of the word victim and lulled into using that impres-
sion as a basis for a guilty verdict.' 7 ' A well-informed jury will likely under-
stand that while a crime may have in fact occurred, reference to the victim as
the victim does not make an innocent defendant culpable. To assert that the
term victim would sway the jury is to assert that the jury cannot follow the
charge of the court, the presumption of innocence, or the standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt.
162 See, e.g., Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 79 (2000); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
387 (1964).
163 See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 79 (1895); Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S.
80, 97 (1836); United States v. Broadie, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24553 (4th Cir. 2004).
16' Defense Motion, Bryant (No. 03 CR 204), supra note 72.
165 Id.
166 Donnelly v. DiChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974).
167 See supra text notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
168 Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647.
169 See supra text notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
170 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 78-79 (1895).
171 See generally State v. Nomura, 903 P.2d 718, 723 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995).
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F. Less Prejudicial Reference
Various alternatives to the term victim have been suggested to prevent the
alleged harm asserted by defense counsel in rape cases. The court in People v.
Bryant rejected the defense request to refer to the accuser as the "complaining
witness" or in the alternative the "complainant."' 7 2 The court instead ordered
that the parties refer to the accuser either as the "alleged victim" or by her
proper name. 173 Furthermore, the juiry instructions and special interrogatories
would refer to the "alleged victim" as "person. "174
The prosecution in People v. Bryant argued that use of any word other
than victim would carry with it potential confusion and inaccuracy.' 7 5 The
rationale was that the use of the terms "accuser" or "complaining witness" vio-
lated the victim's constitutional and statutory right to be treated with fairness,
respect, and dignity.' 76 "Accuser," the government argued, is confusing, mis-
leading, and legally inaccurate, while "complaining witness" can refer to the
victim, the outcry witness, or the police officer who submitted reports. 1 77
However, in a rape case there is only one victim-one person who alleges a
crime was committed against her.'
78
Two key harms arise from the court's decision in People v. Bryant. First,
as noted infra, the term "alleged victim" is violative of the presumption of
credibility afforded to victim-witnesses.1 79 Use of the modifier-"alleged"-
casts aspersions on the credibility of the accuser' 80 and may cause the with-
drawal of the victim, or future victims, from the criminal justice process.' 8 ' In
issuing its order, the court in People v. Bryant put the victim in a suspect class
defined by the nature of the crime-rape-and the nature of the defense-
consent.
Second, jurors generally unfamiliar with legal terminology 182 would
arguably benefit from a consistent use of terms. The constant flux between
proper name, "alleged victim," and "person" serves only to confuse the
factfinder in a trial where the body of evidence is primarily testimonial. If the
court determines "alleged victim" is the proper means of reference, then
172 Order, Bryant (No. 03 CR 204), supra note 4.
173 Id.
174 Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
175 People's Response to Defendant's Brief to Preclude the Use of the Word Victim, People
v. Bryant (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2004) (No. 03 CR 204), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/
exec/media/eagle/courtdocuments.htm.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 154-61.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 140-41; see also Anderson, supra note 73.
182 See, e.g., Perkins v. Komarnyckyj, 834 P.2d 1260, 1265 (Ariz. 1992) (While addressing
the decision of a judge to correct a juror regarding the use of the term "jurist," the court
stated "j]urors are often unfamiliar with correct legal terminology .... "); Boyd v. State, 715
So. 2d 825, 842 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (noting the average juror "is unfamiliar with legal
terms and concepts"); John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty
Pleas to Aid Criminal Juror Comprehension, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1187, 1236 (2002) (In
arguing for reform of juror instructions Cronan notes that most instructions "contain legal
terms that are foreign to most jurors.").
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"alleged victim" should be used consistently at trial, with special interrogato-
ries, and in jury instructions.
The final alternative is to refer to the victim by nature of her allegations;
however, this is likely the most prejudicial method. Presumably, any defendant
would prefer victim to "the woman who accuses the defendant of forcibly pene-
trating her without her consent." When considering the use of more prejudicial
terms, such as "the killer" or "butcher," one court noted that use of the term
victim was quite mild in comparison.18 3 _
On balance, the most reasonable term to use is victim. It does not invade
the defendant's presumption of innocence, but preserves the victim-witness's
presumption of veracity. It avoids the potential confusion that will likely arise
when a multitude of terms are used and accurately describes the appropriate
party in a way that "complaining witness" and "accuser" does not. Further-
more, use of the term victim is not unfairly prejudicial, does not result in a
denial of due process, and is preferable to the available options, and therefore
its use should not be precluded at trial.
As a final measure of amelioration, the court, in accordance with Federal
Rule of Evidence 105,184 may provide a jury instruction regarding the use of
the term victim by the prosecution and its witnesses. A sample limiting instruc-
tion may read as follows:
Throughout the trial, the prosecution and its witnesses may periodically refer to
[proper name of victim] as the victim. Such reference should not be taken as an
endorsement of the witness's veracity or defendant's guilt. The use of the term vic-
tim does not relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the use of the term victim is a means of eliminat-
ing multiple and confusing methods of reference to [proper name of victim] in this
case. It is the province of the jury to judge the believability of a witness and deter-
mine the weight to be given to the testimony. In doing so, the jury should consider
any evidence presented which may have a reasonable tendency to prove or disprove
the truthfulness of the witness.
Such an instruction would address the many concerns raised by defense
counsel while preserving the integrity of victim-witnesses and reducing the
potential for confusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court's ruling in People v. Bryant illustrates the necessity to institute a
fair and consistent means of referring to the victim of rape at trial. The nega-
tive impact of the decision may adversely affect the willingness of rape victims
183 Anderson v. Texas, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3892, *11-12 (Tex. App. June 14, 2001).
The court compared use of the term victim to decisions which deemed terms such as
"slaughter," "killer," "sex slave," and "butcher," not improper. Id. at 12. Furthermore, the
court stated that while the defense "could have requested use of the term 'alleged victim' ...
it is unlikely he would have succeeded or that this would have had a different effect on the
jury." Id.
184 FED. R. EVID. 105 provides: "When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for
one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the
court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly."
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to come forward or be involved in the prosecution of their cases, particularly
when there is no overt evidence of physical trauma and the defendant argues
the penetration was consensual.
While many arguments are made by defense counsel regarding the nega-
tive effect the use of the term viciim has on a defendant's right to a fair trial and
his presumption of innocence, those arguments lack adequate foundation or
support. Reference to the victim as the victim is not inflammatory or unfairly
prejudicial and is not an improper expression of veracity or guilt. Furthermore,
such reference does not invade the province of the jury. Rather, reference to
the victim of rape as the victim safeguards the defendant's presumption of inno-
cence while preserving the victim-witness's presumption of credibility. The
preservation of this presumption is proper given the jury's role is assessing
credibility and the lingering social acceptance of many rape myths that taint
jury deliberations in these cases.
If a court deems that some form of unfair prejudice will result from such
reference, a limiting instruction would provide an adequate remedy. However,
while "alleged victim" may also provide a viable alternative, the term fails to
recognize adequately the status of the victim and instead portrays a presump-
tion of incredibility. Ultimately, the court will have to determine whether it
will reinforce the inequality inherent in rape prosecution or preserve the valid-
ity of the complaint until controverted. Whichever path the court chooses, it
must, at a minimum, apply its order consistently to avoid juror confusion.
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